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Abstract
The increasing convergence of corporate and control systems networks creates new challenges for the security of
critical infrastructure. There is no argument that whilst this connection of what was traditionally an isolated
network, to a usually internet enabled corporate network, is unavoidable, segregation must be maintained. One such
challenge presented is how to properly and appropriately configure an active directory environment to allow for
exchange of required data, but still maintain the security goal of separation of the two networks. This paper argues
that while separate domains may seem to achieve this goal, the reality is that a domain is not a security boundary,
and in fact does not effectively segregate the networks. A more secure and robust barrier can be created through the
creation of separate forests, which still allows for one-way trust relationships to be established between the two
forests for authentication and data exchange. The paper concludes that there is no loss of functionality or
communication through the use of two forests, but there is a loss of security if using one.
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INTRODUCTION
Process control systems (PCS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are responsible for
controlling the majority of the industrial systems that modern society relies upon. These systems control everything
from traffic lights through to large scale refineries. Additionally, all critical infrastructure providers also rely upon
these systems for safety and reliability, through continuous monitoring and operation.
Traditionally SCADA systems were designed around reliability and safety, and if they were network connected they
were connected on isolated internal networks for the purposes of control and management; essentially a closed
system. Typically in these situations security was not a consideration due to the isolated nature of the systems and
their closed nature. It should be remembered that these systems were implemented at a time when computing and
information technology was also largely conducted in isolated installations or laboratories around the globe
(Stouffer et al, 2007).
With advances in technology, we are becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent on these connections
for the full functioning of modern society. One of the main conduits and enablers for this has been the rapid
expansion of the Internet. Correspondingly, as a result of the growth of the Internet there has been a convergence on
the TCP/IP protocol suite as the dominant network protocol for business and industry. This has seen many hardware
and software vendors, including SCADA vendors, align their products with this kind of reality (Igure et al, 2006).
This transition to a greater level of interconnectedness has impacted on the security posture of these systems.
Threats and vectors that did not exist prior to this transition are now becoming realisable threats. There is also an
increasing reliance on public telecommunications networks to link previously separate SCADA systems making
them more accessible to attacks. The increasing use of published open standards and protocols, in particular Internet
technologies, expose SCADA systems to Internet or network borne attacks, that were not practical on proprietary
protocols that were used previously to control such systems. This increased interconnection of SCADA systems to
corporate networks is a significant threat in itself, enabling and making them accessible to undesirable entities e.g.
malfeasant insiders (Jackson-Higgins, 2007).

Much has been written about designing the physical network infrastructure in order to achieve segregation between
the two networks (INL, 2006; Permann et al, 2006; Stouffer et al, 2007), but there is little to be found in terms of
using logical barriers to achieve this goal. Common, obvious network security measures such as firewalls,
demilitarised zones (DMZ), intrusion detection systems and virtual private networks (VPN) are all mentioned in
these reports, but the access controls provided by using forests as security barriers are not discussed. This paper will
examine the use of Active Directory in order to further achieve segregation through the use of logical separators.
Further, it will compare and contrast the security issues involved in using a single forest with using multiple forests.

FORESTS, TREES, DOMAINS AND TRUSTS
In Active Directory terms, a forest is defined as two or more trees which do not share a contiguous namespace. A
tree is a collection of domains which do share a contiguous namespace. A domain is a collection of computers,
users, printers and other network resources which share a common directory database (Aubert 2004). In order to
better understand the reason as to why domains within a tree do not achieve segregation, it is necessary to look at the
history of the domain concept through the evolution of Microsoft’s Server operating systems.
When Microsoft first introduced the concept of domains with its Windows NT server operating system, it was
defined as being a security boundary. That is, members of one domain could not exchange information nor see
network assets in another domain, unless trust relationships were explicitly defined (Figure 1).

Figure 1: The Windows NT domain as security boundary model. There is no hierarchy and information is only
exchanged where explicitly defined (Microsoft, 2009).

Such relationships could be established through the use of trust relationships, but these needed to be setup and
configured by an administrator: they were not on by default. With the introduction of active directory with Windows
2000 Server, this was no longer the case, as this new logical hierarchy now included the forest, which was a
superstructure over and above that of the domain (Figure 2). Additionally, domains within a forest would now trust
each other by default. Of even greater import from a security perspective is that these trusts are transitive, with
domains within a forest implicitly trusting one another, meaning that there is effectively no separation between two
domains. That is, if domain A trusts domain B, and domain B trusts domain C, then domains A and C implicitly
trust each other.

SECURITY RISKS OF THE SINGLE FOREST MODEL
Increasing the integration of the corporate and the SCADA networks offers a greater ease of availability of
information from, and control access to, the SACDA network. That same access, while creating increased efficiency
in business flows, also increases the attack face presented by the SCADA network. Corporate networks exist in an
environment of distrust and operate on access only after authentication. SCADA devices exist in an environment of
trust, void of authentication and trusting that whatever instructions sent to them are valid. Increasing the possibilities
for breach from one network to the other is always going to be a matter of risk management. Given the trusting
environment of a SCADA communications and the nature of a critical infrastructure network, the impact of a breach
is going to be greater than in the untrusting environment of a corporate LAN.

Figure 2: Domains within a single forest have two way transitive trusts by default, meaning that there is effectively
no security barrier by default (Microsoft, 2006)

Any integration
The most significant security issue is that of firewall configuration. For a domain or even domains of a single forest
to function they have certain communication and replication requirements. This means that the firewall(s) separating
the two networks are vulnerable to misconfiguration. If the person configuring the firewall rules is not familiar with
AD replication and communication requirements then those rules may be more permissive than needed. The
securing of AD communication requires a combination of specific server and AD knowledge to reduce traffic to
predictable ports and firewall operation and configuration techniques. If either of these is lacking then the other will
suffer in either AD performance or overly permissive rules. Any of these oversights creates a possible breach in
lower layered communications that could be exploited.

SSO also provides a single point of compromise. Any account that has legitimate cross-network authentication,
whether this is intra-domain, inter-domain or inter-forest is a target for attack. The attack need not be overt either; a
virus would be able to spread from the untrusting to the trusting environment through the means of automated
authorization. The concept is an implementation of the principle of least privilege. Such authentication measures do
not enable otherwise un-implementable access but rather is an ease of use feature.
As soon as an implementation shares a common AD schema it also shares common groups for authorization such as
Domain Administrators, Backup operators, Server Operators, Enterprise Administrators and Schema Administrators.
Some of these groups are only domain wide, some forest wide. The removal of these groups as avenues of attack
improves only as segregation increases.
Single Domain
If Active Directory is configured as a single domain with multiple sites then SSO is not the only issue. Inappropriate
group policies can be inadvertently applied to critical machines triggering unforeseen results. This model also allows
the authentication and authorization of users through group membership. Security groups can be nested and the
method is documented best practice. The obscurity such group membership creates can easily cause unintended
access to sensitive resources.
A single domain also reduces the autonomy of the SCADA network. It adds additional groups that gain default
authorization to resources such as the domain administrator and backup operators. Two domains in a single forest
reduce the number of groups that are granted default authorization but groups that cross the domain boundaries, such
as the Enterprise Administrators, do still exist. Such default authorizations provide avenues for elevation of
privilege attacks.
A single forest implementation shares a common DNS structure, whether this is internal or external to AD itself it is
required for the functioning of AD. The DNS is required to host the address of every AD object for AD to function
and such can be queried for information such that normally unseen targets can be identified. Because AD requires
DNS to run effectively, DNS itself becomes a target for attack. If DNS can be denied normal operations, AD in turn
will cease to function effectively. Critical machines that are AD members may in turn have authentication or
authorization issues and become victims of a denial of service attack. Such attacks, such as DNS cache poisoning,
can in turn lead to the compromise of key machines such as domain controllers.
If Active Directory is configured as a single domain with multiple sites then replication is not the only issue.
Inappropriate group policies can be inadvertently applied to critical machines triggering unforeseen results. This
model also allows the authentication and authorization of users through group membership. Security groups can be
nested and the method is documented best practice. The obscurity such group membership creates can cause
unintended access to sensitive resources.
Privilege escalation is an attack that is used to gain additional authorization from a previously authenticated account.

SUGGESTED MODEL – A TWO FOREST APPROACH
In order to aid in achieving segregation between the corporate and process control networks, the suggested model
for Active Directory is to use two forests with no established trusts. The absence of established trusts does not
preclude the flow of information: rather, trusts are used primarily as a means of enabling background authentication
in a single sign on environment. The absence of trusts between the two forests does place a certain amount of
additional user overhead in the way of credentials but also functions as a safety mechanism to prevent unintentional
or unwanted intrusions.
Microsoft’s recommendations for when to use Multiple Forests
The Active Directory Service is a Microsoft product incorporated in their Windows Server product range. There is a
large amount of information available from Microsoft in terms of planning, installing, deploying, configuring,
maintaining and managing an active directory environment. Among these is a document detailing when it is
appropriate to use a multiple forest environment or deployment. The first three of the seven reasons listed to justify
the use of multiple forests apply to a SCADA environment, and are listed as follows:


Service autonomy: The nature of the structure or operation requires full control of delivery of the
directory service.



Service isolation: The nature of the structure or operation requires full protection from interference with
delivery of the directory service.



Data isolation: Legal ramifications require full protection from interference with directory data.
(Microsoft, 2003)

Whilst the reasons listed above are primarily business based, it can be seen that these criterion also apply to creating
the segregation as required for a SCADA environment.
Why 2 Forests?
The primary reason for using two forests is the single sign on (SSO) mechanism used for authentication and
authorization in the windows domain environment without a user having to provide authentication credentials once
they have been validated. This mechanism is designed for streamlining authorization to resources in an untrusting
environment for ease of access. Trusts are a means of extending this mechanism beyond the traditional domain
model, enabling authorization to resources domains and even across forests.
The suggested model for any critical infrastructure integration would have to be a two forest approach. The reasons
for this are that as integration increases additional vulnerabilities and avenues for misconfiguration are introduced. A
two forest approach still allows for one way information flow into the business network while maintaining isolation.
While single sign on is an ease of use feature it also reduces security by transferring authentication used in an
untrusting network (corporate) for use in a trusting network (SCADA). Figure 3 illustrates a logical example where
there are two forests, and a firewall separates the two networks. Obviously it would be necessary to open some ports
in the firewall to allow for the two forests to exchange information.

Forest A
Corporate

Forest B
SCADA

Figure 3: The recommended two forest model to create an Active Directory security boundary

A corporate network is based on the principle of an untrusting environment. That is access to resources is prevented
until authorization is granted. Hosts do not automatically accept incoming requests until some form of trust
(authentication/authorization) is established. By default, all entities are un-trusted until proven otherwise. This
principle, the principle of least privilege, places security over performance.
A SCADA (critical infrastructure) network is a trusting environment. Any request is accepted as long as it is valid.
This is done because it is accepted that all entities are trusted to “do the right thing”. This moves processing power
that would otherwise been used establishing authorization into performance and response. In a real time network
such as a SCADA network, this can be a vital factor when controlling devices requiring critical timing.
There are many risks in an untrusting network which are accepted by implication. When combining an untrusting
(corporate) and trusting (SCADA) network the implicit acceptance of these risks that are built into every node of a

corporate environment are imposed upon the trusting environment which is likely to be ill prepared to deal with
them.

CONCLUSION
This paper has not argued that segregation through use of the two forest model will protect a SCADDA or process
control system network in of itself. As is best practice in securing any network, this segregation measure is best used
as part of a defense in depth strategy. The usual security measures, polices and devices must still also be used. They
are not mentioned specifically in this paper as that was not the focus, and has been covered in numerous reports by
other agencies such as Sandia and Idaho National Laboratories.
The disadvantages, issues and security vulnerabilities that are inherent to the single forest model have been
discussed in this paper, while the only advantages of using such a model relate to reduced overhead in installation
and configuration. Specifically, the single forest model may be easier to implement, configure and administer than a
two forest model, but it just is not as secure. While the two forest model will not necessarily defined against an
external or malware based attack, it will certainly mitigate the insider threat, be it intentional or unintentional. It may
also be that because Active directory configuration is not normally seen as a front line or obvious security measure,
it is often overlooked.
At a fundamental, the choice between a single or two forest model comes to one simple factor: ease of
administration. There is no task that cannot be achieved through the use of two forests, but it does mean that
increased administration may be the cost. However, the cost of using administrative overhead as a reason not to use
a two forest model means that logical separation is not achieved. If we are not able to continue the isolation of
process control systems from corporate networks, it is only a matter of time until we see a targeted attack interrupt
the supply of essential services, such as power and water. The consequences of this would be severe interruption to
the business process for all concerned, and not just the control system operator. There may also be regulatory
consequences, particularly if the result of a network and control system breach had environmental impact.
Finally, there is no process, function or communication in a single forest model that cannot be configured in a two
forest model. The decision to use a single forest model over a two forest model must not be made on the basis that it
may mean more work for IT administrators, as the cost of doing so is that segregation is not achieved, and the
process control network is not as protected as it should be.
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